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For the past fifty years few books on art history
have exercised an influence comparable to that of
Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion.1 Published in
1960, the book came to be regarded as the pivotal
art historical articulation of the view that concep-
tual thinking, beliefs and expectations predeter-
mine the totality of human perceptual experience
– that there is no innocent eye, to use Gombrich’s
phrase. The view itself was not novel at the time:
previously, during the 1920s and 1930s, it had been
promoted in various forms by a number of Ger-
man-speaking art historians and philosophers
such as Dagobert Frey, Erich Rothacker and,
arguably, Martin Heidegger.2 The importance of
Gombrich’s contribution was partly in his com-
prehensive presentation of this view to English-
speaking scholars and partly in the way he corre-
lated it with the latest psychological research on
human perception of his time (Gestalt and »New
Look« psychology) as well as with the then-influ-
ential views of his philosopher friend Karl Popper. 
For a number of decades the debate about
Gombrich’s book has mainly concentrated on its
position in the wave of cultural relativism that
evolved during the 1960s and came to dominate
English-speaking scholarship in subsequent de -
cades.3 If the totality of human perception is pre-
determined by available concepts, as Gombrich
argued, and if concepts are acquired as a result of
one’s membership of a specific culture, then
human perception has to be determined by one’s
membership in the collective that constitutes that
culture. Further on, if no segment of perception is
culture-independent, it follows that the totality of
perceived reality is culturally constructed. Gom-
brich abhorred such collectivist and anti-realist
interpretations of his book.4 Nevertheless, since
the book came out in the same decade as Willard
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1 Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion. A Study of Psycholo-
gy of Pictorial Representation, London 1960.
2 Erich Rothacker’s Satz der Bedeutsamkeit stated that
only what is relevant and meaningful for a specific col-
lective can be perceived or interpreted: »…erlebt,
wahrgenommen, ausgedeutet, bearbeitet und wortin-
haltlich differenziert wird de facto nur was für die betre-
ffende Gemeinschaft in irgend einem Sinne bedeutsam
und belangvoll wurde…«, (Erich Rothacker, Zur
Genealogie des menschlichen Bewusstseins, Bonn 1966,
44 – 48, here 44.) This view was endorsed by the art his-
torian Dagobert Frey, who phrased it by saying that
›ohne erlebte Bedeutung keine Wahrnehmung‹, Frey,
Kunstwissenschaftliche Grundfragen. Prolegomena zu
einer Kunstphilosophie, Vienna 1946, 33. In Frey’s view,
because of temporal-ethnic determinism (»zeitlich-
volkhaften Bindung der darstellenden Gestaltung den
Stoff«. Frey, ibid., 33), a Japanese and an European per-
ceive differently. A similar understanding of visual per-
ception is to be found in sections 15 and 31 of Martin
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1993, 61 – 72 and
142 – 148. Heidegger insisted that our primary relation-
ship with objects is not grounded perception, but rather
in considering them as instruments, equipment. A ham-
mer we use may have perceivable properties, but they
remain unnoticed until there is a problem with its use –
when the hammer, for instance, may need to be repaired.
In other words, seeing is derivative of understanding. A
good summary of Heidegger’s views on this topic is in
Harrison Hall, Intentionality and world: Division I of
Being and Time, in: Charles Guignon, The Cambridge
Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge 1993, 122 – 140.
3 For a summary of these debates see Branko Mitrovic´ , A
Defence of Light. Ernst Gombrich, the Innocent Eye
and Seeing in Perspective, in: Journal of Art Historiog-
raphy 3, 2010, 1 – 30.
4 See Jan Bakoš, Introductory: Gombrich’s Struggle
against Metaphysics, in: Human Affairs 19, 2009, 239 –
250 for a summary of Gombrich’s attacks on collectivist
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I perceive the object; my brain then processes this
percept and I recognise that I am perceiving a
chair. According to this view, conceptualisation
(classification) follows perception: you need to
see first in order to grasp what you have seen. 6
Refuting this view in the realm of art history was
the central aim of Gombrich’s Art and Illusion. 7
In Gombrich’s view, it is wrong to conceive of
perception as a passive process, registration of
data by the retina (172). Pure passive perception is
simply not possible for the human mind and see-
ing is never merely registering (297). Perception is
an active process, conditioned by our expecta-
tions; it can be described as the modification of
anticipation – it is never independent of our
expectations (172, 228, 298). »To see is always to
see ›something out there‹« (260). Gombrich’s the-
sis that there is no innocent eye thus implies that
all of our visual experience is always determined
by our capacity to conceptualise the contents of
our perception – otherwise he would have to
admit that human visuality is at least sometimes
capable of passive reception.
The same understanding of human visuality is
to be found in Gombrich’s writings in later
decades. In the Introduction to his 1979 book The
Sense of Order he explains that there is no neat
perception and that our cognitive apparatus
places stimuli in prearranged slots.8 The organisa-
tion of these slots is neither inborn nor regular. In
van Orman Quine’s Word and Object, Hans
Georg Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, Tho -
mas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Peter Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s Social
Construction of Reality and Nelson Goodman’s
Languages of Art, it was originally widely read as
part of the same wave of cultural determinism. In
subsequent decades Gombrich made huge efforts
to combat this interpretation of his views.
While Gombrich strongly related his views to
contemporary scientific theories of vision, subse-
quent scholarship has made no attempt to discuss
the implications of later developments in the psy-
chology and philosophy of perception for the
positions he articulated. Fifty years is a very long
period in the history of twentieth century science.
It is hard to imagine that the assumptions on
which Gombrich based his arguments fifty years
ago are fully credible in the same form today. The
intention of this paper is to analyse Gombrich’s
views and arguments in the context of subsequent
developments in the philosophy and psychology
of perception.5
Innocence of the Eye
Arguably, the common-sense view of human
visuality is that one first perceives things and only
then classifies that which one has seen: light
reflected from an object first reaches my eyes and
5 It is remarkable how little work has been done on the
implications of the contemporary theories of vision for
the methodology of art history. Consequently, the re-
evaluations of Gombrich’s positions from the point of
view of contemporary psychological research are also
very rare. One important exception is Ladislav Kesner’s
article Gombrich and the problem of the Relativity of
Vision, in: Human Affairs 19, 2009, 266 – 273. Kesner
suggests that new research may seem to support the his-
toricity of vision, though it may be too early to draw
definite conclusions. In this paper I present a different
perspective – that research on non-conceptual content
and the impenetrability of early vision makes the belief
in the historicity of vision obsolete. The apparent dis-
agreement between my and Kesner’s paper derives from
the fact that they pertain to different realms of psycho-
logical research: I discuss the constitution of visual-spa-
tial experience while Kesner’s interests concentrate on its
conceptualisation. It should be noted that V. S.
Ramachadran’s and William Hirstein’s article The Sci-
historiography. For a discussion of the anti-realist inter-
pretations of Art and Illusion, see Murray Krieger, The
Ambiguities of Representation and Illusion: An E. H.
Gombrich Retrospective, in: Critical Inquiry 11, 1984,
181 – 195. See also Gombrich’s response, Ernst Gom-
brich, Representation and Misrepresentation, in: Criti-
cal Inquiry 11, 1984, 195 – 201, here 195. By the 1980s
Gombrich became a target of systematic attacks by the
proponents of cultural-determinist and anti-realist
orthodoxy. See for instance Norman Bryson, Vision and
Painting. The Logic of the Gaze, London 1985; Joseph
Masheck, Alberti’s ›Window‹: Art-Historiographic
Notes on an Antimodernist Misprision, in: Art Journal
50, 1991, 34 – 41. Gombrich’s irritation can be felt in his
Preface to the 2000 reprint of Art and Illusion, Prince-
ton 2000, 1. For an analysis of Gombrich’s debates with
anti-realists and cultural constructivists, see also David
Blinder, The Controversy over Conventionalism, in: The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 41, 1983, 253 –
264, and Mitrovic (as note 3).
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perception is always based on theories, some of
which are even incorporated in our physiology. A
sense-organ, he says, is comparable to a theory; it
is impossible to separate observation from the
theoretical elements of interpretation.12 Another
important source of influence on Gombrich was
contemporary psychological research.13 In the
Introduction to The Sense of Order, he gave cred-
it to Gestalt psychologists for being the first to
oppose the understanding of perception as the
passive registration of stimuli.14 He was also
acutely aware of current trends in the most recent
psychological research of his time. Art and Illu-
sion was written in the heyday of »New Look«
psychology. This stream of psychological re -
search started in 1947 when Jerome Bruner estab-
lished in his experiments that the value which
people associate with physical objects affects their
perception of the size of these objects, while the
perception of unexpected objects (e.g. non-stan-
dard playing card such as a black three of hearts
or a red two of spades) requires much more time
than then the perception of expected objects.15
During the 1950s, Bruner’s experiments stimulat-
ed a wave of similar research about the impact of
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the 1974 essay »Mirror and the Map« he explicit-
ly states that »there is no fixed correlation
between the optical world and the world of our
visual experience. … There is the influence of past
experience and of expectations, the variables of
interest, ›mental set‹ and alertness, not to speak of
variations in the observer’s physiological equip-
ment and in the adjustment of the perceptual sys-
tem to changing conditions«.9 »Seeing, like repre-
senting, is a transitive verb and demands an
object« (180). Similarly, in the 1978 essay »Image
and Code« he reaffirms the view that »to perceive
is to categorize, or classify«.10
Gombrich formulated his views on visuality
largely under the influence of his philosopher
friend Karl Popper. Popper conceived of percep-
tion as comparable to the scientific acquisition of
knowledge: hypotheses precede observations and
»it is through the falsification of our suppositions
that we actually get in touch with ›reality‹.«11 In
the opening section of Art and Illusion Gombrich
reports that Popper dubbed the idea that percep-
tion precedes conceptualisation »the bucket theo-
ry of mind« (28). Sense-data, untheoretical items
of information cannot exist, Popper insisted; our
ence of Art. A Neurological Theory of Aesthetic Expe-
rience, in: Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, 1999, 15 –
51 mainly concentrates on the explanation of recognition
in dealing with artworks; while the authors of another
article cited by Kesner actually admit that their findings
pertain to postperceptual processes (Angela H.
Gutchess, Robert R. Welsh, Aysecan Boduroglu, Denise
C. Park, Cultural differences in neural function associat-
ed with object processing, in: Cognitive, Affective &
Behavioral Neuroscience 6, 2006, 102 – 109, here 107).
For a wider perspective see David Freedberg, Empathy,
Movement and Emotion, in: Franziska Nori and Martin
Steinhoff (eds), Sistemi Emotivi. Artisti contemporanei ta
emozione e ragione. Emotional systems. Contemporary
Art between Emotion and Reason, Milan 2007, 38 – 61.
6 The understanding of concepts as mental representa-
tions that encode classificatory criteria is typically
referred to as the »classical theory of concepts«. See for
instance Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Concepts
and Cognitive Science, in: Stephen Laurence and Eric
Margolis (eds.), Concepts, Cambridge, Mass. 1999, 3 –
82, esp. 9 – 14. 
7 See the Appendix to Mitrovic (as note 3), for a survey of
Gombrich’s statements about the »innocence of the eye«. 
8 Ernst Gombrich, The Sense of Order. A study in the
Psychology of Decorative Art, Oxford 1979, 4.
9 Ernst Gombrich, Mirror and the Map: Theories of Pic-
torial Representation, cited according to Ernst Gom-
brich, The Image and the Eye, London/Ithaca 1982, 172
– 214, here 177.
10 Ernst Gombrich, Image and Code. Scope and Limits
of Conventionalism in Pictorial Representation, cited
according to Gombrich (as note 9), 278 – 297, here 286.
11 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolution-
ary Approach, Oxford 1972, 360.
12 Karl R. Popper, Is there an epistemological problem of
perception, in: Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave
(eds.), Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Proceed-
ings of the International Colloquium in the Philoso-
phy of Science, London 1965, vol. 3), Amsterdam
1968, 163 – 164.
13 For discussions of Gombrich’s relationship with con-
temporary psychological theories, see Richard Wood-
field (ed.), Gombrich on Art and Psychology, Man-
chester 1996.
14 Gombrich (as note 8), 4. For Gombrich and Gestalt
psychology see also Richard Woodfield, Introduction
to the debate, in: http://www.gombrich.co.uk/dis-
pute.php [last accessed 1 November 2012].
15 The first of these experiments is described in Jerome
Bruner and Cecile C. Goodman, Value and Need as
Organizing Factors in Perception, in: Journal of
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our visual experience are thoroughly structured in
accordance with our conceptual frameworks. The
idea is that the construction of visual experience is
thoroughly permeated by our conceptual think-
ing. The claim that »seeing« is always »seeing
something« (or »seeing as«) means that we can
only see what we can classify (conceptualise). In
the words of the philosopher Marx Wartofsky, it
is not that »in order to hit you, I must be able to
see you« but rather, »if I see you, it is because I
want to hit you«.18
The view that perception is inseparable from
classification is nevertheless not philosophically
unproblematic. Decades before Gombrich, or
New Look psychologists, Edmund Husserl had
warned that such a position ends up in infinite
regress.19 Husserl’s point was that if one cannot
perceive a white ball without classifying it as a
white ball, then a white ball is perceived only
insofar as it is similar to another white ball. This
amounts to saying that one does not perceive spe-
cific things (properties), but rather their similarity
to other things and properties. But then one has
to say that such similarities themselves are per-
ceived only insofar as similar to other similarities;
and to perceive these further similarities one
needs to perceive their similarity with other simi-
larities, and so on ad infinitum. 
Ambiguities of Perspective
It was, however, not Husserl’s finely tuned argu-
ments, but the anti-realist implications of the
view that there is no innocent eye that haunted
Gombrich for decades after the publication of Art
and Illusion. If one can perceive things only
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our beliefs and expectations on perception – a
trend that came to be known as »New Look« psy-
chology. As Ian Gordon observed, psychological
literature of the 1950s »abounds in examples of
perception being tricked in ways which reveal the
involvement of knowledge, experience and famil-
iarity… Publications of the time describe oddly-
shaped rooms which appear normal when viewed
through peep-holes, pictures and figures which
are difficult if not impossible to decipher without
verbal hints, delays in recognising briefly exposed
words when these are threatening or taboo, and of
course, many illusions. Showing the malleable
and vulnerable aspects of perception under labo-
ratory conditions increased the belief that this
was how perception must be all the time.«16
The claim that the perception of objects is
inseparable from their conceptual classification
relies on the reasonable assumption that we do
not perceive the actual image that the light rays
produce on our retinas. The retinal image itself is
certainly independent of our knowledge – it is
created by the light rays that reach the retina from
the object. However, substantial mental process-
ing is necessary in order to convert the light stim-
ulation of the retina into the phenomenal image
that we perceive. After all, the image on the retina
is upside down and, since most people have two
functioning eyes, there are two images. But we do
not see things upside down and we see only one
image – consequently, our cognitive apparatus
cannot be merely reproducing the retinal im -
ages.17 Proponents of the idea that there is no
innocent eye, that seeing is inseparable from clas-
sification (conceptualisation), use this fact to
argue that the mental processes which constitute
Abnormal and Social Psychology 42, 1947, 33 – 44.
Bruner and Goodman asked school children to adjust
an iris-type opening on a mechanical device to the size
of coins. The children substantially overestimated the
size of coins – in the case of the quarter-dollar coin by
35% on average. It turned out that the social back-
ground of the children affected their responses: the
children from less affluent background overestimated
the size of coins by twice as much as those from afflu-
ent background. (A separate, »control«, group of chil-
dren was asked to do the same with gray cardboard
disks of the same size as coins; these children per-
formed their task with very good accuracy.) For the
second experiment see Jerome Bruner and Leo Post-
man, On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm,
in: Journal of Personality 18, 1949, 206 – 223. In this
experiment Bruner and Postman showed playing cards
to their subjects – some usual ones, such as five of
hearts, others non-standard, such as a black three of
hearts. The result was that the recognition of non-
standard playing cards took about three times as much
time as the recognition of the standard ones.
16 Ian Gordon, Gombrich and the psychology of visual
perception, in: Woodfield (as note 13), 60 – 77, here 62.
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processes construct.20 Because of his commitment
to defending perspective and realist art, Gom-
brich vehemently opposed this view. His con-
cerns are understandable: if reality (the way we
perceive it and what we know about it) is a cul-
tural construct, then resemblance to reality
becomes a social convention too; the similarity of
perspective and realist paintings to possible visual
experience becomes a social-historical category,
rather than an optical one. On the one hand,
Gombrich wanted to defend the transcultural
validity of perspectival representation and realist
painting—that their resemblance with the objects
they represent is more than a mere cultural con-
vention. On the other, he actually did state in Art
and Illusion that there is no reality without inter-
pretation (363). Obviously, if reality is a product
of interpretation and thus dependent on the con-
cepts one has received from one’s own culture, it
becomes hard to explain how similarity with that
reality could be culture-independent. Not only
perspectival images, but any art that would rely
on representation understood as resemblance
becomes a result of social conventions: depending
on the interpretative context, any image can
resemble anything. A perspectivally correct rep-
resentation cannot claim a privileged status when
it comes to representing spatial reality.21
It was the philosopher Nelson Goodman who
first took Gombrich to task for defending per-
spective, in his review of Art and Illusion.22
Because Gombrich refused to discuss perspective
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because one classifies them in a certain way, then
it is impossible to say that when perceiving e.g. a
red and a blue circle, one perceives them as differ-
ent because one sees their individual colours and
then classifies one of them as blue and another as
red. Rather, one sees the blue circle as blue and the
red circle as red because one classifies them as
such. But if we then ask why one classifies things
as red and blue it turns out that this classification
has to be either absolutely random or based on
some properties of these things (e.g. they reflect
light of certain frequency, which is perceived as
colour). However, if the classification of objects
depended on the properties they possess, one
would have to perceive these properties before
and independently of classification. The assump-
tion that there is no innocent eye, that perception
cannot be separated from classification precisely
asserts that this is impossible. But then we have to
conclude that our perception of things in the real
world is independent of any properties of these
things. The way things are is then utterly irrele-
vant for the way we see them. For the proponents
of cultural constructivism that came to dominate
the humanities in the final decades of the twenti-
eth century, anti-realism of this kind meant that
that what we perceive as reality is merely a social
construct. If seeing is always »seeing as«, then
seeing has to be a result of enculturation. Gom-
brich’s constructivist opponents, such as Norman
Bryson, argued that there is no other reality to be
experienced beyond the reality that the social
17 Similarly, although the area of the retina where optic
nerve leaves the eye contains no receptor cells, we do
not see a black hole in the area of this blind spot; the
brain fills in our visual experience – it makes guesses on
the basis of what is seen in the areas neighbouring to
those of the blind spot (see Maurice Hershenson, Visual
Space Perception, Cambridge 1999, 29 – 73). Further on,
although we are not aware of it, our eyes are never stag-
nant – they move in rapid movements called saccades
that take between a two-hundredth and a twelfth of a
second. Between the saccades the eye pauses for a small
part of a second and then jumps on another saccade. The
eye is blind during saccadic movements and what we
see, we see in the moments between them. While our
phenomenal vision is continuous, it consists of disjoint-
ed snapshots that the brain puts together at high speed.
(For an interesting account of experiments with saccadic
movements see John Grimes, On the failure to Detect
Changes in Scenes across Saccades, in: Kathleen Akins
(ed.), Perception, New York 1996, 89 – 131). 
18 Marx W. Wartofsky, Perception, Representation and
the Forms of Action: Towards an Historical Episte-
mology, in: idem., Models: Representation and the Sci-
entific Understanding, Dordrecht etc. 1979, 188 – 210,
here 195.
19 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (Husser-
liana, vol. XIX/1), The Hague1984, 197 – 207, esp. 200 –
201. 
20 Bryson (as note 4), 33.
21 See in particular the opening section of Gombrich’s
»Image and Code« (as note 10) for his own description
of this theoretical quandary.
22 Nelson Goodman, Art and Illusion; a Study in the
Psychology of Pictorial Representation by E. H.
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claimed that because of the concave surface of the
retina, we actually perceive straight lines as
curved.26 Since perspectival drawings represent
straight lines as straight and not as curved, he fur-
ther inferred that such drawings are not realistic,
that they do not represent things the way we see
them. The argument is fallacious, since a perspec-
tival drawing is not intended to imitate the retinal
image, but to deliver a bundle of light rays equiv-
alent to the one that would be received from the
object(s) it represents. As Gombrich points out,
even if straight lines were perceived as curves, we
would still have to trace them as straight on the
paper in order to perceive them as curved.27
The claim that all representation is always con-
ventional, was one of the central theses of Good-
man’s Languages of Art.28 According to Good-
man, a mode of representation counts as realistic
in proportion to how stereotyped it is in a given
social context (36). »Realistic representation, in
brief, depends not upon imitation or illusion or
information but upon inculcation. Almost any
picture may represent almost anything« (38).
Goodman was aware that in order to sustain this
claim he had to dismantle the argument that a per-
spectival drawing represents by delivering to the
eye the same bundle of light rays as the one that
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as conventional, »his treatment of this subject is
often puzzling«, Goodman concluded.23 Gom-
brich’s standard response to the view that per-
spective is a mere social convention was to point
out that a perspectival representation typically
evokes instant and effortless recognition.24 To
those who claimed that resemblance is merely a
cultural category, he used to point to the animals
that use visual resemblance to protect themselves
from other animals (caterpillars looking like
twigs, butterflies that appear to have eyes on their
wings) or the cases in which animals are tricked
by visual resemblance (decoy ducks, angler’s
bait).25 An object (including a picture or a per-
spectival rendering) that resembles another object
(a spatial disposition of objects) does so because it
reflects and delivers to the eye a similar bundle of
light rays. Perspective in that case is a geometrical
method to construct, on a piece of paper, a draw-
ing that will yield a bundle of light rays similar to
that yielded by the depicted object(s). Such an
understanding of perspective, Gombrich notes in
his article »Western Art and the Perception of
Space«, answers Erwin Panofsky’s argument that
the ability to read perspectival images is a product
of cultural developments. Famously, in his »Die
Perspective als ›symbolische Form‹« Panofsky
Gombrich, [book review], in: The Journal of Philoso-
phy 57, 1960, 595 – 599.
23 Ibid., 598.
24 Ernst Gombrich, Visual Discovery through Art, cited
according to Gombrich (as note 9), 11 – 39, here 19.
Similarly, Gombrich (as note 9), 198.
25 Gombrich (as note 9), 24; Gombrich (as note 10), 286.
26 Erwin Panofsky, Die Perspektive als ›symbolische
Form‹, cited according to the version published in
Erwin Panofsky, Deutschsprachige Aufsätze, Karen
Michels and Martin Warnke (eds.), 2, vols., Berlin
1998, vol. II, 664 – 757, here 668 – 669. For Gombrich’s
views see Ernst Gombrich, Western Art and the Per-
ception of Space, in: Space in European Art, Council of
Europe Exhibition, exh. cat., Tokyo, National Muse-
um of Western Art, Tokyo 1987, 16 – 28, here 19 – 20.
For the same counterargument to Panofsky’s thesis see
also Genesius Ten Doesschate, Perspective, Funda-
mentals, Controversials, History, Nieuwkoop 1964, 46
– 56, esp. 49 and also Maurice Henri Léonard Pirenne,
Optics, Painting & Photography, Cambridge 1970, 148
– 149. But I am unaware that such refutations of
Panofsky’s article were made before the 1960s – that is,
forty years after its original publication. Considering
the number of scholars working in various fields to
which Panofsky’s influential article pertained, it is
remarkable that it took such a long time to make the
point that its central claims were wrong. His claim that
the geometrical postulates of the Euclid’s Optics differ
from those required for the geometrical construction
of perspective was thus refuted only in 1982 (C. D.
Brownson, Euclid’s Optics and its compatibility with
linear perspective, in: Archive for History of Exact Sci-
ences 26, 1982, 165 – 193) while the claim that before
the Renaissance space was not conceived as homoge-
nous in 2004 (Branko Mitrovic , Leon Battista Alberti
and the Homogeneity of Space, in: Journal of the Soci-
ety of Architectural Historians 63, 2004, 424 – 440). 
27 Gombrich, »Western Art« (as note 26), 20.
28 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: an approach to a
theory of symbols, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1976.
29 For Goodman’s errors see David Carrier, Perspective
as a Convention: On the Views of Nelson Goodman
and Ernst Gombrich, in: Leonardo 13, 1980, 283 – 287
(including the subsequent exchange, Leonardo 14,
1981, 86 – 87) and Branko Mitrovic´, Nelson Good-
man’s Arguments against Perspective: a Geometrical
Analysis, in: Nexus Network Journal 15, 2013, forth-
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ent dispositions of shapes in space. Goodman
infers from this that identity in the pattern of light
rays does not constitute a sufficient condition for
representation. In his »Mirror and Map« Gom-
brich presents the same argument by saying that
»while we can work out what the projection of a
given three-dimensional object will be like on a
given plane, the projection itself does not give us
adequate information about the object concerned,
since not one but an infinite number of related
configurations would result in the same image«.32
In »Western Art and the Perception of Space« he
states an example: while a horizontal square-tiled
floor projects a picture according to the laws of
perspective, the two-dimensional projection is
insufficient to establish that the floor is indeed
horizontal and composed of square tiles; it might
have been inclined and composed of trapezoids of
various shapes.33
It took a stroke of genius, however, to convert
this same argument that Goodman used against
perspective into an argument showing that
although all human perception is conceptually
driven, perspective is not a cultural convention.
The point, Gombrich thus responded to Good-
man, is precisely that a perspectival rendering can
represent an infinite number of different spatial
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would be received from the object(s) it represents
(11). His book therefore opens with a series of
geometrical arguments against perspective (10 –
19), in an effort to show that geometrically con-
structed perspectival drawings fail to deliver such
bundles of light rays. With one exception, all
Goodman’s arguments are based on fallacious
geometrical reasoning and mainly derive from a
miscomprehension of the concept of picture
plane.29 Nevertheless, although the book original-
ly had a number of devastating reviews (Rudolf
Arnheim equated Goodman to »a chemist who
used art works to illustrate the difference between
paper and canvas« while the reviewer in The
Philosophical Quarterly compared him to »a
vehemently Marxist stockbroker«) nobody seems
to have noticed Goodman’s errors about perspec-
tive for more than ten years, until David Carrier
published his analysis.30
It is, however, the one argument that was not
geometrically wrong – the so-called ambiguity
argument – that interests us here. Assume that a
perspectival representation indeed delivers to the
eye a bundle of light rays matching the one
received from the object itself.31 The problem is
then that the same bundle of rays could be also
received by the eye from any multitude of differ-
coming. Similarly, David Topper in On the Fidelity of
Pictures: A Critique of Goodman’s Disjunction of Per-
spective and Realism, in: Philosophia 14, 1 – 2, 1984 187
– 197 and also, without mentioning Goodman directly,
but criticising his arguments, idem, Perspectives on
perspective: Gombrich and his critics, in: Woodfield (as
note 13), 78 – 99, here 85. Also, Michael Kubovy, The
Psychology of Perspective and Renaissance Art, Cam-
bridge 1986, 122 – 126 and Mitrovic  (as note 3), note 54.
30 At least I have not managed to find a mention of
Goodman’s perspectival errors in the reviews I have
consulted. Rudolf Arnheim, Painted Skies and Uni-
corns – Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of
Symbols by Nelson Goodman [book review], in: Sci-
ence, New Series 164, 1969, 697 – 698; B. C. O’Neill,
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols
by Nelson Goodman [book review], in: The Philo-
sophical Quarterly 21, 1971, 361 – 372; Wolfgang M.
Zucker, Languages of Art, an Approach to a Theory of
Symbols by Nelson Goodman [book review], in: The
Art Bulletin 52, 1970, 223 – 224; Monroe C. Beardsley,
Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Sym-
bols by Nelson Goodman [book review], in: Philoso-
phy of Science 37, 1970, 458 – 463; Daniel Rigney, Lan-
guages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols by
Nelson Goodman [book review], in: Contemporary
Sociology 8, 1979, 319 – 320; Annette Barnes, Lan-
guages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols by
Nelson Goodman [book review], in: Perspectives of
New Music 9, 1971, 330 – 340; Christiana M. Smith,
Symbolic Systems, Cognitive Efficacy, and Aesthetic
Education. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theo-
ry of Symbols by Nelson Goodman [book review], in:
Journal of Aesthetic Education 3, 1969, 123 – 136;
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Languages of Art [book
review], in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
34, 1976, 491 – 496; Michael Thompson, Languages of
Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols by Nelson
Goodman; Laws of Form by C. Spencer Brown [book
review], in: Leonardo 7, 1974, 175 – 176. For Carrier
see Carrier (as note 29). 
31 Goodman (as note 28), 11.
32 Gombrich (as note 9), 191. See similarly Ernst Gom-
brich, The ›What‹ and the ›How‹: Perspective Repre-
sentation and the Phenomenal World, in: R. Rudner and
I. Scheffler (eds.), Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of
Nelson Goodman, Atasacadero, Calif. 1972, 129 – 149.
33 Gombrich (as note 26), 15.
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human visuality shows, is not that our vision
depends on conceptual knowledge in order to
select the correct disposition of objects from a
pool of possible interpretations of what we see.
The assumption that accurate information about
the disposition of objects in the world is inferred
from our knowledge about the world has been
replaced with the understanding that the brain
computes the disposition of objects in space from
the picture it receives, while relying on specific
constraints and rules about the possible and likely
three-dimensional properties of spatial objects. 37
By this time, psychologists have studied and
established a substantial inventory of such rules
and constraints. For instance, various combina-
tions of lines that represent corners are analyzed
using interpretative constraints in a way that
results in the elimination of all but spatially possi-
ble dispositions of lines meeting in a corner. In
1998, Donald Hoffman listed thirty-five different
constraints that the brain uses in order to organise
our visual experience – for instance: a straight line
in an image is always to be interpreted as a three-
dimensional straight line; if the tips of two lines
coincide in an image, they are to be interpreted as
coinciding three-dimensionally; lines collinear in
an image are interpreted as three-dimensionally
collinear; elements near each other in an image are
interpreted as three-dimensionally close; a curve
that is smooth in an image is interpreted as
smooth in three dimensions.38 These principles
constitute built-in (hard-wired) constraints used
by the brain to calculate the spatial disposition of
objects from the information that light rays pro-
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dispositions of objects—but that we read it as a
representation of one of them. It is through the
selection of one interpretation out of many that
our conceptual knowledge exercises a decisive
impact on our visual experience. A good illustra-
tion of this explanation is an experiment made by
Adalbert Ames.34 Ames placed a disposition of
wires organised according to the laws of perspec-
tive into a box. The wires could have been, for
instance, disconnected, but they were arranged so
that they were perceived to be in continuation
with each other. They were positioned to look
like a chair made of wire when seen through a
peephole. In »Mirror and Map« (1974) Gombrich
discussed, but was still hesitant to endorse, the
view that we rely on our past (conceptual) experi-
ence when we choose one interpretation of a per-
spectival picture from many. A dozen years later,
in »Western Painting« he explicitly adopted this
view; in the example of the square-tiled floor
mentioned above, he says that we perceive the
floor as horizontal and the tiles as square because
of our expectations.35 It is our familiarity with the
shapes of objects that helps us organize our visual
experience into a spatial one.36 Perspectival pro-
jection, his argument allows one to conclude, is
thus optically defined by the geometry of light – it
is not a cultural convention. Nevertheless, our
ability to read perspectival drawings fully
depends on our conceptual capacities; there is no
innocent eye.
The solution is ingenious, but it has not been
confirmed by subsequent psychological research.
The important point, as modern research on
34 Gombrich (as note 9), 192.
35 Gombrich (as note 26), 15.
36 Ibid, 17.
37 A good account is in Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Seeing and
Visualizing. It’s not what you think, Cambridge, Mass.
2006, 94 – 120.
38 Donald D. Hoffman, Visual Intelligence. How We
Create What We See, New York 1998, 24 – 171. See
also the account in Pylyshyn (as note 37), 94 – 123.
39 See for instance Gordon (as note 16), 62.
40 The standard view of experimental psychologists is
that although the projection of an object on the retina
can have different shapes if the object changes its slant,
»the object appears to retain its shape« (Hershenson
[as note 17], 118); that »perceived shape usually corre-
sponds to objective shape« (D. W. Massaro, The per-
ception of rotated shapes: A process analysis of shape
constancy, in: Perception and Psychophysics 13, 1973,
413 – 422, here 420); that shape (or size) constancy is
the phenomenon in which the percept of the shape of
a given object remains constant despite changes in the
shape of the object’s retinal image (Zygmunt Pizlo, A
theory of shape constancy based on perspective invari-
ants, in: Visual Research 34, 1994, 1637 – 1658, here
1637); that »we see them [objects] not in shapes indi-
cated by the laws of perspective but in the shapes
which these figures ›really‹ possess« (Robert Thouless,
Phenomenal regression to the Real Object, in: British
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but also sometimes very similar to an image gen-
erated by the principles of perspective. The phe-
nomenon of constancies pertains to situations
when an object’s shape or size are accurately per-
ceived although they should not be, according to
the laws of optics and perspective. Psychological
research suggests that although the visual angle an
object takes within a visual field shrinks with the
increased distance of that object, most people per-
ceive the size of the object to remain the same.39
In other words, according to psychologists, the
visual experience of most people tends to follow
the real size and shape of objects, regardless of the
distance or slant of these objects.40 The literature
thus states that two identical chairs perceived at
respective distances of 12 and 6 meters are per-
ceived as being of equal size.41 In the case of cir-
cular plates on a dinner table seen from aside, psy-
chologists state that »when we look obliquely at a
circular object, we see it not as an ellipse but as a
true circle.«42 As a result, seen from aside, a plate
looks like what it »really« is, circular and not
elliptical, as its retinal image would suggest.43
Another example of constancies that is often cited
pertains to the way an approaching person is per-
ceived. As the person comes closer, from a dis-
tance of ten yards to a distance of five yards, psy-
chologists say that most people will not perceive
that the visual image of the person grows in size,
but that the visual image remains approximately
the same.44
The further an object from the eye, the smaller
is the angle of the visual field it takes; proportion-
ally, its retinal image also grows smaller with
increased distance. In psychological literature, the
perception that follows the retinal image (i.e.
changes in visual angle) and consequently obeys
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vide us with when they reach the retina. For
instance, in the case of Ames’ experiment, such
principles guide one to select a specific disposi-
tion of wires as the interpretation of what is seen
– and they result in inaccurate interpretation. If
the tips of two wires coincide when seen through
the peephole, it is assumed that they coincide in
space, although this is not the case. This spatial
interpretation derives from the interpretative
constraints the brain operates with and not from
our conceptual knowledge. The fact that the
image looks like a known object is irrelevant; the
brain first sorts out what it regards as the spatial-
ly credible disposition of wires and only then can
one conceptualise what has been perceived. As we
shall see later in this article, modern research
shows that such spatial thinking is impenetrable
to and unaffected by our concepts, beliefs and
knowledge.  
Constancies
Insofar as perspectival drawings replicate the
bundles of light that would reach our eyes from
the objects they represent, they are defined by
objective, physical laws. Similarly, the retinal
image is generated by the light that enters the eye
and is therefore defined by physical laws. How-
ever, this does not mean that we see in perspective,
that the phenomenal image generated by the
human brain follows the laws of perspective. A
substantial body of psychological research on the
phenomenon of constancies, that has been prolif-
erating since the early decades of the twentieth
century, suggests that the spatial organization of
human visual experience (the image generated by
the brain) can sometimes be very different from,
Journal of Psychology 21, 1931, 339 – 359, here 339).
»The perceptual constancies have in common that
phenomenal experience is more in accord with the
external object than with the proximal stimulus or at
least with that aspect of the proximal stimulus consid-
ered most relevant.« (Irvin Rock and William McDer-
mott, The perception of visual angle, in: Acta Psycho-
logica 22, 1964, 119 – 134, here 119). A useful historical
survey of the four most significant approaches to the
problem of constancies is in Pizlo (as note 40).
41 Doesschate (as note 26), 74.
42 Thouless (as note 40), 339.
43 Ibid., 339. Similarly Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychol-
ogy, New York 1947, 45; William James, Principles of
Psychology, New York 1890, 180. A historical survey
of psychological research on constancies is in William
Epstein, Historical Introduction to the Constancies,
in: William Epstein (ed.), Stability and Constancy in
visual perception: mechanisms and processes, New
York 1977.
44 Köhler (as note 43), 44. Similarly, Gombrich (as note 26),
22.
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sees a book or a desk: what one sees are bundles of
light rays reflected by some objects – whereas in
order to say that one sees a book or a desk, one
needs also to recognise what the object is.48
Gestalt psychologists aimed to redirect psycho-
logical research from the study of artificially iso-
lated sensations to immediate spontaneous per-
ception of everyday experience. As William
Ep stein described, »Whereas the instrospectionist
tried to strip away the constancies so that the gen-
uine sensory core could be observed, the Gestalt
psychologist considered the constancies in per-
ception to be the primary data.«49 One of the
founders of Gestalt psychology, Wolfgang Kö h -
ler, stated that »objects exist for us only when sen-
sory experience has become thoroughly imbued
with meaning«50 – and it is not hard to see the
attraction of such a position for those art histori-
ans who wanted to argue, like Gombrich, that
there is no innocent eye.
Constancies need not be understood to contra-
dict the optical validity of the geometrical con-
struction of perspectival representations, such as
drawings and paintings. Gombrich regularly
reminds that the »effortless recognition« of per-
spectival representations is accompanied by the
restoration of constancies.51 He points out that
few realist painters use strict geometrical con-
struction when painting a still life or a landscape.
Rather, they endeavour to reproduce in painting
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the laws of perspective is called proximal percep-
tion. The literature also points out that for most
people the apparent size of objects may change
scarcely at all when distance changes; the term
»size constancy« suggests that the perceived size
is constant even though this need not be the case
with the visual angle.45 Perception that follows
the real size of objects and is independent of the
visual angle is called distal perception.
Gombrich returns to the topic of constancies
over and over again, and he discusses the standard
examples from psychological literature: that the
perceived size of a person approaching us in the
street does not grow as the person comes closer,
or that circular plates seen at an angle on a table
are perceived as circular.46 He was well informed
about the current research on the topic, and also
strongly influenced by the Gestalt psychologists’
views in these matters. For the gestaltists, empha-
sis on constancies was one of the central argu-
ments in their struggle against (what they called)
introspectionism – the view that one should dif-
ferentiate between pure sensation and perception
(the latter understood to include knowledge). The
introspectionist approach to perception strove to
reconstruct the original sensation as independent
of our knowledge or beliefs, which were seen as
accidental aspects of our experience that are irrel-
evant for perception.47 This position implied that,
strictly speaking, it is not correct to say that one
45 A. H. Holway and E. G. Boring, Determinants of
apparent visual size with distance variant, in: American
Journal of Psychology 54, 1941, 21 – 37, here 21.
46 For Gombrich’s sources on constancies see Gordon (as
note 16). Gombrich, Visual Discovery (as note 24), 18
– 24; Gombrich (as note 26), 22.
47 For a summary of Köhler’s arguments see his Gestalt
Psychology (as note 43) as well as Epstein (as note 43),
»Historical Introduction«. Köhler (ibid.), 43.
48 Köhler (as note 43), 43.
49 Epstein (as note 43), 2.
50 Köhler (as note 43), 44.
51 Gombrich, »Visual Discovery« (as note 24), 19. See also
his discussion in »Western Painting« (as note 26), 22.
52 Gombrich, »Visual Discovery« (as note 24), 19; Gom-
brich (as note 26), 22 – 23;
53 Gombrich, »Visual Discovery« (as note 24), 21; Gom-
brich (as note 10), 280 – 281.
54 Gombrich (as note 9), 201. As Woodfield (as note 13)
in the »Introduction«, 1 – 27, 14 stated: »If the world
actually did look like cubist painting, we would have
enormous difficulty in getting around it, and if the
world looked as if it was depicted in twelfth-century
pictures, archers would have no difficulty in shooting
their pray around corners.«
55 It is interesting to consider in this context the discus-
sion about the way railway tracks are perceived.
According to one view, straight railway tracks should
be seen as converging in distance: their posts are all
equal and the further they are the smaller they appear.
Goodman actually used the convergence of railway
trucks in distance in one of his embarrassingly erro-
neous arguments against perspective: he argued that it
is not clear why vertical electric posts, which are also
parallel, are not drawn as converging. (Goodman [as
note 28], 16.) Marx Wartofsky, however, claimed that
»parallel lines going off into the distance appear, in
normal binocular vision, to be just what they are—
parallel lines going off into the distance, without con-
vergence.« (Marx Wartofsky, Rules of Representation:
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visual experience can follow the visual angle – in
other words, the principles of perspective. He
thus reports an experiment with three small card-
board trees that were aligned so that one occluded
another, in order to show that the principle of
occlusion does operate in human vision according
to the geometry of light rays.54
In making this point, Gombrich was up-to-date
with the psychology of his time. That the
gestaltists’ emphasis on constancies yields but a
partial understanding of human visuality was not
unknown at the time. After all, many of us per-
ceive circular plates seen at a slant as elliptical, and
chairs or people further away as smaller than those
closer to us.55 It seems fair to say that we perceive
slanted circles as ellipses, but that we know they
are circles – a view that, psychologists report, is
often stated by psychology freshmen.56 It is
enough to hold one’s hand next to the line of sight
of a chair across the room in order to see that the
image of the chair appears to be smaller than that
of the hand.57 The 1931 experiment by Robert
Thouless was among the first attempts to resolve
this dilemma. Thouless presented tilted circles to
his subjects and asked them whether they saw a
circle or one of the ellipses from a given cata-
logue.58 The subjects reported that they saw
ellipses, but the ellipses they selected in the cata-
logue were closer to a circle than the ellipses they
should have seen according to the laws of perspec-
tive. In other words, they reported to have seen a
compromise between the real shape of the object
and what the laws of perspective suggested; the
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what they see: they look at the object and paint it.
In order to be able to reproduce things in a paint-
ing the way they are seen, painters have to be able
to observe without constancies: they have to be
able to see visual objects relative to the angle of
the visual field these objects occupy. If human
perception always strictly followed the principle
of constancies, this would never be possible.
Gombrich says that visual artists possess the skill
to perceive according to the size of the visual
angle, to »break constancies« by measuring the
apparent size of an object (i.e. the relative size of
the section of the visual field taken by the object).
Proximal perception enables them to produce
drawings that can be appropriately interpreted,
with constancies, by people who look at them.52
Visual experience without constancies reproduces
geometrical relationships between all visual
angles of all objects seen from a certain point in
space. Such perception also accurately reproduces
the occlusion of objects in accordance with the
fact that light rays travel along straight lines. In
visual experience that includes constancies, one
supposedly sees the same two objects at different
distances as the same in size – which means that
the more remote object must be occluding some
neighbouring objects even though light may be
reaching the eyes from those objects. Gombrich
called the exact, point-by-point mapping of what
the eye would see from a certain point in space,
(assuming that light travels in straight lines) the
»eye-witness« principle.53 Occlusion in human
perception became Gombrich’s central proof that
The Virtues of Constancy and Fidelity put in Perspec-
tive, in: idem [as note 18], 211 – 230, 217.) Among psy-
chologists, there exists a remarkable disagreement
about the way railroads are perceived. Irvin Rock thus
observes that »If we stress constancy of size, as has
been tried in the literature since the Gestalt revolution,
we cannot explain the vivid impression of convergence
that very observer will tell you he has«. (Irvin Rock, In
Defence of Unconscious Inference, in: Epstein [as note
43], 321 – 372, here 347. In line with this statement, Don
McCready (On size, distance, and visual angle percep-
tion, Perception and Psychophysics 37, 1985, 323 – 334,
here 323) talks about »the paradox of converging paral-
lels«. According to V. R. Carlson, the hypothesis is
that railways tracks are »perceived to be parallel and
never meet but are cognitively interpreted to con-
verge«. (V. R. Carlson, Instructions and Perceptual
Constancy Judgments, in: Epstein [as note 43], 217 –
254, here 220.) She also cites J. J. Gibson (220), in
whose view, »an object can apparently be seen with
approximately its true size as long as it can be seen at
all«. Another view, mentioned by Alberta Gilinsky, is
that railroad tracks are »now seen to converge, now
seen not to converge«. (Alberta S. Gilinsky, The Effect
of Atitude upon the Perception of Size, in: The Amer-
ican Journal of Psychology 68, 1955, 173 – 192, here
174.) 
56 Köhler (as note 43), 50; Rock (as note 55), 347.
57 For this argument see Carlson (as note 55), 218.
58 Thouless (as note 40).
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duces constancies. During the 1950s, experimen-
tal psychologists also realised that the perception
that subjects reported is affected by the instruc-
tions that were given to them. As Leibowitz and
L. O. Harvey observed, the most effective experi-
mental variable in size constancy experiments are
the instructions given to the subjects.65 In 1958 R.
B. Joynson made a study about the subjects’
understanding of the expressions »apparent size«
and »look the same size«.66 It was found that the
majority of subjects understood »apparent« as
different from the objective size. Three years
before Joynson, Alberta Gilinsky examined the
ability of subjects to compare objects at great dis-
tances by giving them two kinds of instructions:
»objective instructions« that pertained to the esti-
mation of the objective size of the object and
»retinal instructions« that pertained to the appar-
ent visible size of the object.67 Such different
instructions produced results that manifested
clear difference between the two attitudes in
observation. 
It is thus fair to say that psychological research
confirms Gombrich’s views about constancies. It
is understood that human visuality is somehow
dual: we can perceive in terms of objective sizes
and shapes or in terms of the visual angle; though
in the case of many people, bringing this latter
attitude to attention may require effort. Gom-
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result was rather »a tendency to constancy« than
the proper constancy of size.59 An important point
is that if subjects are to see circles and not ellipses
when they look at tilted circles, they must some-
how know that they are looking at circles. Thou-
less’ subjects’ perception was thus, arguably,
affected by their knowledge. In 1941 A. H. Hol-
way and E. G. Boring examined what happens
when information about the shape, size, distance
and slant of the perceived object is gradually
reduced. The result was that constancies were
reduced to zero. 60 In subsequent decades, similar
experiments yielded similar results: when cues that
enable the subjects to determine the distance,
shape and slant of the object are removed, the sub-
jects’ perception follows the visual angle.61 J. Lang-
don thus established that constancy disappeared
when the cues of depth have been removed;62 H.
Leibowitz and L. E. Bourne discovered that con-
stancy disappears if the object is exposed to light
for very short periods of time, such as one tenth of
a second, while William Epstein established that
full constancy requires exposures longer than half
a second.63 Leibowitz also discovered that subjects
with higher intelligence paid less attention to con-
stancy in their perception.64
All this research goes hand in hand with Gom-
brich’s view that human perception sometimes
reports the visual angle and sometimes repro-
59 Ibid., 353
60 Holway and Boring (as note 45).
61 See Gilinsky (as note 55), 173 for a summary.
62 J. Langdon, The Perception of a Changing Shape, in:
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 3, 1951,
157 – 165.
63 H. W. Leibowitz and L. E. Bourne, Time and Intensi-
ty as Determines of Perceived Shape, in: Journal of
Experimental Psychology 51, 1956, 277 – 281; William
Epstein et al., Perceived shape at a slant as a function of
processing time and processing load, in: Journal of
Experimental Psychology 3, 1977, 473 – 83.
64 H. W. Leibowitz, I. Waskow, N. Loeffler, F.Glaser,
Intelligence Level as a Variable in the Perception of
Shape, in: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy 11, 1959, 108 – 112.
65 H. W. Leibowitz and L. O. Harvey, Effect of instruc-
tions, environment, and type of test object on matched
size, in: Journal of Experimental Psychology 81, 1969
36 – 43; cited according to Carlson (as note 55), 217.
66 R. B. Joynson, An experimental synthesis of the Asso-
ciationist and Gestalt accounts of the perception of
size, in: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
10, 1958, 65 – 76 and 142 – 154. Cited according to
Carlson (as note 55), 236.
67 Gilinsky (as note 55). It is interesting to consider the
outcome of Gilinsky’s experiment. She presented her
subjects with two objects. One was a large triangle
placed at a distance of 100 feet and whose visible size
could be changed by rising it from or lowering it into
a pit. The other object was a similar triangle of
unchangeable size that was placed at distances that
varied between 100 and 4000 feet from the observer.
The subjects were asked to adjust the size of the
changeable triangle to the unchangeable one. Some
subjects were instructed to achieve objective matches
of size, others to match the visual angle. The results of
those whose instructions pertained to objective
matches did not follow strictly the rules of size con-
stancy while the responses of the subjects who were
asked to adjust the visual angle showed a higher level
of consistence. In this latter case, the statistical stan-
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commonly used. It is, nevertheless, in this second
sense that one says that »distant objects appear
smaller«. The proximal sense can be noticed and
attended to, once it is pointed out, although for
most people everyday perceptions are based on
the distal model.
Non-conceptual content
Fred Dretske’s 1969 book Seeing and Knowing
was the first significant philosophical attempt to
oppose the view that perception is inseparable
from conceptualisation.73 Dretske’s efforts in the
book largely concentrated on showing that per-
ception can be independent of our beliefs. His
assumption is that there is no conceptualisation
without beliefs: insofar as my seeing a cat depends
on me being conceptually aware that what I see is
a cat, then the fact that I perceive a cat must also
be inseparable from my belief that I am seeing a
cat.74 Having made this point, Dretske claims that
there is a primitive visual ability that is indepen-
dent of how we conceptualise what we see and
which we share with a »cocker spaniel or a pet
cat« (4). People can see maple trees without think-
ing that they see a tree or even a physical object,
he says (6). When people sometimes say: »I do not
know whether I really saw something or I imag-
ined it« their perception is obviously not accom-
panied by any identifying belief. Similarly, it is
hard to imagine that a dog’s ability to see a scene
depends on the dog’s beliefs: rather, it depends on
Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 76. Band / 2013
brich described that artists have to »break« con-
stancies—and in psychological literature one
often reads that attention to the perception of the
visual angle is typical of visual artists.68 The psy-
chologists Irvin Rock and McDermot thus say
that although we do not see our retinal image we
see in terms of it;69 in their view, the gestaltists’
emphasis on constancies was excessive (132). In a
recent book that surveys the modern understand-
ing of human visuality, Maurice Hershenson dif-
ferentiates between »object or linear size« and
»extensivity or visual angle size«.70 He points out
that visual angle size, or the proportion of the
visual field that the object covers, is only brought
into awareness with effort.71 In an extensive sur-
vey of research on constancies published in 2002,
the psychologist Dejan Todorovic differentiated
between the distal, proximal and phenomenal
domain of human visual percep tion.72 The distal
domain consists of the outside world and its
objects; the proximal domain is the optical projec-
tion of the external world on the retina, while the
phenomenal domain is the conscious visual
awareness of the world (126 – 127). According to
Todorovic´ , the standard view in contemporary
psychology is that »perceived (or phenomenal)
size« has two senses: the conscious impression of
the distal size of environmental objects (the size
as measured by measuring tapes), and the con-
scious impression of pure visual extent, or the
amount of visual field covered by an object.
Todorovic´ suggests that this second sense is less
dard deviation was lower and the agreement between
subjects was more determinate and less individualized
(187). Gilinsky concluded that the distinction
»between perception (immediate experience) and esti-
mation (knowledge and inference) may still be perti-
nent despite the explanation offered by Gestalt psy-
chology« (187). In any case, her experiment clearly
showed that the instructions given to the subjects can
induce a radically different attitudes to perception.
68 Kirk Ludwig, Explaining why things look the way
they do, in: Akins (as note 17), 18 – 59, 50; Bruner and
Goodman (as note 15), 35; Rock and McDermot (as
note 40), 132. 
69 Rock and McDermot (as note 40), 119. See also Rock
(as note 55).
70 Hershenson (as note 17), 116.
71 Ibid., 116. But he also describes continuous perspective
transformations that result from a movement around
the object and directly denies constancies: »A stationary
surface at a slant to a viewer project onto the proximal
stimulus as a perspective transformation of the outline
shape of the surface. When a viewer moves around the
stationary surface, or when the distal surface is in
motion, there is a continuous change of the perspective
transformation in the proximal stimulus.« (154)
72 Dejan Todorovic´, Constancies and Illusions in Visual
Perception, in: Psihologija 35, 2002, 125 – 207, here 125
73 Fred Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, Chicago 1969. See
especially the section »Non-Epistemic Seeing,« 4 – 75.
74 Obviously, I may see something that looks like a cat but
not believe that it is a cat. In that case I would be recog-
nizing that I am seeing something that looks like a cat
and would believe that I am seeing something that looks
like a cat, though I would not believe that it is a cat.
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an inkblot (120). A well-known argument came
from the British philosopher Tim Crane.79
Crane’s starting point is that a person cannot have
contradictory beliefs—for instance, believe at the
same time that a thing is moving and staying still.
Situations when a thing is perceived to move and
stand still at the same time consequently indicate
perception independent of one’s beliefs. This hap-
pens indeed if, for instance, one stares for a period
of time at a scene which contains movement in
one direction, and then looks at a scene which
contains no movement. It will appear that objects
in this latter scene move in the opposite direction
to that of the original movement, and at the same
time, they will appear not to move relative to oth-
er objects in the scene. (Such contradictory per-
ception occurs when one stares at a waterfall and
then turns one’s sight to some stationary object.
The latter then appears to move, although not rel-
ative to its background.) Obviously, such percep-
tion cannot derive from one’s beliefs, since one
would have to believe at the same time that the
object moves and stands still.
Impenetrability of vision
For the past two decades philosophical research
on non-conceptual content has coincided with the
increased tendency of psychologists to differenti-
ate between sense perception and cognitive per-
ception—and the former is assumed to be con-
cept-independent.80 Gary Hatfield in his book
Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 76. Band / 2013
the excellence of the dog’s eyes, the distance of the
scene and so on (15).
A proponent of the view that there is no inno-
cent eye would have denied the validity of these
examples. Among analytic philosophers, Drets -
ke’s book initiated an entirely new field of
research in epistemology and the philosophy of
perception which flourished during the late 1980s
and through the 1990s. The study of the ways in
which perception can have content independent
of the concepts associated with that content came
to be known as the debate about »non-conceptu-
al content«.75 Additional support for this research
came from the latest psychological research on
the perception of animals and children before
they learn to speak. It is often hard to deny that
animals perceive things similarly to humans,
while one is sometimes hesitant to attribute them
the possession of concepts or beliefs that humans
possess.76
Human perception and its contents, it has often
been pointed out in research about non-concep-
tual content, are much richer and fine-grained
than any available conceptual frameworks.77 The
human mind often does not have concepts for all
the nuances of the same colour that a human eye
can differentiate. Some sections of mountains
may be perceived as rounded, others jagged; nev-
ertheless, visual experience is far more specific
than such a verbal description can indicate. 78 Sim-
ilarly, a person need not possess the concept of
symmetry in order to perceive the symmetry of
75 A summary of this research is José Bermúdez and
Arnon Cahen, Nonconceptual Mental Content, in:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://pla-
to.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/content-
nonconceptual/>. A more technical presentation of
various argumentational approaches is in Athanassios
Raftopoulos, Cognition and Perception, Cambridge,
MA 2009, 131 – 353. The particular value of Raftopou-
los’ presentation is that he directly relates the discus-
sions of non-conceptual content to the psychological
research on impenetrability. For a collection of influ-
ential research papers on non-conceptual content see
York Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Con-
tent, Cambridge, MA 2003. See also Bill Brewer, Per-
ceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content, and
Alex Byrne, Perception and Conceptual Content,
both, in: Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Con-
temporary Debates in Epistemology, Mal den, MA
2005, 217 – 230 and 231 – 250. 
76 It does not help to say that we cannot know how ani-
mals think or perceive: in some situations scientists
have managed to construct ways to get around this
problem. For instance, it is possible to teach monkeys
to choose the larger of two rectangles they have been
shown. (See Fred Dretske, Sensation and Perception,
in: Gunther [as note 75], 25 – 41, here 36.) Insofar as
perception depends on available conceptual frame-
works, it is reasonable to assume that monkeys would
perceive these rectangles dependent on the concept
»bigger than.« At the same time, it is very hard to teach
monkeys »intermediate-size« relation – to teach them
to choose, for instance, the medium-sized rectangle
when shown three rectangles. However, since they
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three-dimensional layout of visible objects in the
perceived scene. It enables us to grasp the spatial
disposition of the things that we see, but it does
not relate them to what we know or to what we
remember. According to Pylyshyn, early vision is
independent of any beliefs we may have and does
not deal with identities or names of objects; it is
part of the hardwire of our capacity to see and a
result of the evolution of human species.
One important argument in favour of Py -
lyshyn’s thesis pertains to perceptual illusions.
Psychologists in the past (and the proponents of
New Look psychology especially) regarded optical
illusions as important examples of the malleability
of our perception. For them, optical illusions
demonstrated the strong influence one’s expecta-
tions have on visual experience. But Pylyshyn
turned this argument in the opposite direction. He
pointed out that we perceive an optical illusion
even when we know that we are seeing an illusion.
Consider, for instance, Fraser’s spiral (fig. 1). It
consists of concentric circles that are perceived as a
spiral—and we perceive a spiral even when we
know that we dealing with an illusion and that we
are looking at a set of concentric circles.
Pylyshyn also pointed out that neuroscience
provides little evidence that the brain cells of the
visual system receive information from the parts
of the brain that deal with conceptual thinking.88
It is possible to determine the parts of the brain
that are active in the recognition of highly com-
plex visual patterns, such as human faces. From
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Perception and Cognition noted that the distinc-
tion between these two modes of vision is implic-
it in the way experimental psychologists articulate
the aims of their experiments.81 For instance, an
experiment that tests the cognitive perception of
shapes may try to establish how individual shapes
are classified, while an investigation into the
human perception of shapes will study people’s
capacities to discriminate shapes under various
viewing conditions. Making such distinctions
boils down to distinguishing sense perception
from ordinary reasoning and conscious infer-
ence.82 This led to the understanding of sense per-
ception as »insulated« from conscious perceptual
knowledge and an understanding that general
knowledge cannot influence perception.83
It was through the groundbreaking research of
the psychologist David Marr in the early 1980s
that the separation of »early vision« from the cog-
nitive aspects of visual perception became widely
accepted among psychologists.84 Research on ear-
ly vision pertains to the sensory aspects of per-
ceptual experience, such as shape, colour, size,
distance etc. »Late vision«, understood as con-
trary to »early vision«, covers processes such as
recognising, identifying, or classifying.85 In 1999
the psychologist Zenon Pylyshin published a
highly influential article in which he claimed that
early vision is impenetrable to conceptual think-
ing.86 He compared human vision to a complex
information processing system.87 »Early vision«
is a section of this system; it determines the spatial
have been taught and grasped the relationship »bigger-
than«, it follows that when shown three triangles of
different size they must be able to see and conceptu-
alise that the medium-sized triangle is bigger than the
smallest one, and that it is smaller than the biggest. But
since they cannot conceptualise the relationship
»intermediate-size« – the argument will be that they
can perceive relationships that they cannot conceptu-
alise.
77 See Bermúdez, »Non-Conceptual Mental Content«
for a summary of these arguments.
78 For this argument see Christopher Peacocke, Scenar-
ios, Concepts, and Perception, in: Gunther (as note
75), 107 – 132, here 111.
79 Tim Crane, The Waterfall Illusion, in: Gunther (as
note 75), 231 – 235.
80 For this distinction see Gary Hatfield, Perception and
Cognition. Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology,
Oxford 2009, 5.
81 Ibid., 54.
82 For a list of authors who make this distinction see
Hatfield (as note 80), 11. 
83 Ibid., 11.
84 David Marr, Vision. A Computational Investigation
into the Human Representation and Processing of
Visual Information, San Francisco 1982.
85 Marr did not use the term »late vision«; the phrase is
Hatfield’s (as note 80), 54.
86 Zenon Pylyshyn, Is Vision Continuous with Cogni-
tion?, in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, 1999, 341 –
365.
87 Pylyshyn (as note 37), 50.
88 Ibid., 68 – 70.
86
properties of objects but cannot recognise what
these objects are (visual agnosia). 89 Such patients
for instance, can see their family members but
cannot recognise them. This indicates that the sec-
tion of the brain that deals with visual and spatial
thinking is separate from the section of the brain
that deals with conceptual thinking.
In Pylyshyn’s view, New Look theories, to -
gether with the idea that »there is no innocent
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what is known, it seems that these cells do not
receive information about the identity of the pat-
tern (e.g. face) from other parts of the brain. For
instance, our capacity to recognise a face in a cer-
tain social situation is not supported by our
expectation that we will meet a certain person in
that context. Further on, Pylyshyn drew attention
to the fact that patients with some types of brain
damage are able to perceive and grasp the spatial
1. Fraser spiral. One needs to trace »the spiral« using a pencil in order to see that it consists of circles
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to a certain category, it may seem that such fea-
tures are aesthetically irrelevant. All paintings
have the features that are necessary for them to be
paintings; consequently, these features will not
help us when it comes to evaluating and ranging
them aesthetically. But, Walton argues, this rea-
soning is wrong. The energy or brilliance of a fast
section in a violin concert derives not from the
absolute speed of the music but also from the fact
that it is fast for that particular medium. Paintings
in an unknown style or music from a radically dif-
ferent culture may appear as formless on the first
contact, because one would not be perceiving
them in relation to the specific context they origi-
nate from. Walton’s conclusion, that subsequently
exercised a huge influence on analytic aesthetics,
was that aesthetic properties are always ascribed to
a work of art in accordance with the features that
are standard for such works of art. It is important
to note that this conclusion relies on the assump-
tion that there is no perception without classifica-
tion: if artworks could be perceived independent-
ly of how we categorize them and if some
sentiments (e.g. pleasure) could be derived from
such non-conceptual acts of perception, then it is
unclear why the attribution of some aesthetic
properties (e.g. beauty) could not be independent
of categorisation. Walton thus argued that if we
excavated an artwork from the dust of an archaeo-
logical site on another planet, we would not be
able to attribute to it any aesthetic properties since
we would know nothing about the civilization
that created it and would not be able to categorize
it. But it is far from clear that this need be the case,
and that we may not like its shapes or proportions
independently of what we know or do not know
about its origin. 
The Walton-style position became increasingly
hard to sustain in its strong form by the late
1990s. The British aesthetician Nick Zangwill
opposed it by arguing for a position that he called
moderate formalism—i.e. the view that some aes-
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eye« really belong to 1950s psychology and
derive from the mid-twentieth century spirit of
time and faith in biologically unlimited human
potential.90
Aesthetics
Literature on fine arts has been slow in adopting
the results of research on non-conceptual content
and the impenetrability of vision – certainly much
slower than was the case with New Look psy-
chology during the 1960s. Nevertheless, it is hard
to imagine that positions in art history can be seri-
ously sustained if their fundamental premises
directly contradict the scientific understanding of
human visuality. 
Consider the case of aesthetics – a discipline
with closer links to philosophy and thus prone to
receiving intellectual influences from current
trends in philosophy and psychology faster than
art history. It was Kendall Walton’s 1970 paper
»Categories of Art« that introduced in English-
speaking aesthetics the idea that human vision
results from conceptual thinking.91 Walton did not
mention Gombrich, but the article relied on the
assumption that one sees according to the concep-
tual categories that organise perception. The main
target of Walton’s criticism was the view that an
artwork must stand on its own, independently of
artist’s views, social, historical or cultural circum-
stances. Rather, facts about the origins of artworks
can have an essential role in art criticism. The
argument Walton presented was based on differ-
entiation between standard and variable features
of artworks. A feature is standard if a work of art
belongs to a certain category by virtue of having
that feature; it is variable in the case that it has
nothing to do with the work’s belonging to a spe-
cific category. An object has to have certain prop-
erties in order to count as a painting, Chinese
sculpture or a Byzantine mosaic. Since an object
must have standard properties in order to belong
89 Ibid., 71.
90 For Pylyshyn’s views on the history of the debate, see
Pylyshyn (as note 86), 341 – 342 and Pylyshyn (as note
37), 49 and 83. 
91 Kendall Walton, Categories of Art, cited according to
Joseph Margolis, Philosophy Looks at the Arts,
Philadelphia1978, 88 – 114.
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and some people are colour blind. However, he is
saying that there are aesthetic judgments which
no person will be incapable of making merely
because he or she belongs to a specific culture. 
The demise of the view that perception is con-
ceptually predetermined cannot fail to affect the
methodology of historical research on artworks.
Consider, for instance, the question of what con-
stitutes a credible explanation of an architect’s
decision to apply certain formal properties on a
building. Quite in line with Gombrich’s views, in
his influential 1963 book Intentions in Architec-
ture, Christian Norberg-Schulz argued that archi-
tecture cannot be interacted with at the level of
pure form.94 He claimed that one can only per-
ceive forms as meaningful: that there can be no
immediate experience of architectural works (for
instance their masses or spaces) that is not mediat-
ed through concepts.95 The implication is that
when an architect made design decisions about
the shapes, proportions or spaces of a building,
this decision always had to be based on the mean-
ings he or she attributed to these elements. Ex -
plaining an architect’s design decision is conse-
quently inseparable from stating the meanings
that motivated it – an explanation that relies on
the purely visual preferences of the architect is
thus unsatisfactory, because there can be no pure-
ly visual perception on which such preferences
would be based. However, as we have just seen,
human perception is much more fine grained than
our available conceptual frameworks; notorious-
ly, this kind of methodology regularly suffered
from the inability to find enough meanings (con-
cepts) to account for the totality of spatial and
visual decisions an architect typically has to make
in his or her work. Following Zangwill, however,
we can assume that some decisions were made on
the basis of purely visual-aesthetic preference,
independently of any conceptual consideration.
Methodologically, the study of meanings, the
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thetic properties depend exclusively on formal
properties of objects, while others depend on our
conceptual knowledge about the object.92 It is
plausible to construe Zangwill’s »formal« proper-
ties as those that the human mind would process
using early vision: shapes and the spatial layout of
things. It would then follow that some aesthetic
judgments can be based on non-cognitive visual
processing. Compare this view with Walton’s:
Walton’s position was credible in the 1970s
because it went hand-in-hand with the stance that
there is no perception without classification. In a
context in which this position was generally
accepted, it could hardly have been credible to
suggest that aesthetic judgments can be indepen-
dent of conceptual thinking. How could one
make concept-independent aesthetic judgments if
these judgments pertain to what one perceives
and, at the same time, one cannot perceive with-
out conceptualising? 
If Zangwill were merely arguing that some aes-
thetic properties can be attributed independently
of our conceptual knowledge and interaction with
artworks, then his thesis about moderate formal-
ism would be a mere plea for a wider perspective
on aesthetic problems than the 1960s cultural-
determinist understanding of human perception
allowed us to formulate. But his important claim
is that »beauty is the top dog« – and he clearly
attributes greater significance to non-conceptual
aesthetic properties.93 Walton’s position, one
could say, was ultimately parochial: if all aesthetic
properties are assessed on the basis of available
concepts, and since the availability of certain con-
cepts is limited to certain cultural contexts, it eas-
ily follows that aesthetic evaluation is always cul-
turally delimited. Zangwill, however, is more
cosmopolitan than Walton. True, he stops short of
claiming that there are universally valid aesthetic
judgments: after all, the ability to judge aestheti-
cally may be similar to the ability to see colours
92 See Nick Zangwill, In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic
Formalism, in: idem, Metaphysics of Beauty, Ithaca
2001, 82 – 101.
93 Nick Zangwill, The Beautiful, the Dainty and the
Dumpy, in: Zangwill (as note 92), 9 – 23, here 23.
94 Christian Norberg-Schulz, Intentions in Architecture,
Oslo 1963, according to the second edition 1966, 85. 
95 Ibid, 85 – 94.
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the test of time were those he imported from Pop-
per, Gestalt- and New Look psychologists. Con-
sidering his faith in science and the wide range of
his interests, it is hard to see how he could have
avoided relying on them. For decades, this faith
made him concentrate huge efforts on showing
that the same scientific theories that provided so
much ammunition for the rise of cultural relativism
were also compatible with his universalist and
humanist agenda. As it turns out, these scientific
theories have in the meantime faded into history –
while the agenda still remains relevant today. 
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con cepts associated with architectural (art-)
works, becomes relevant only when it can be doc-
umented that they have indeed motivated the cre-
ative decisions of artists and architects. 
Coda
When it comes to art historical topics – such as the
validity of perspective or the artistic implications
of research on constancies – Gombrich’s intuitions
have been generally vindicated by subsequent psy-
chological research. The ideas that have not stood
Photo credit: 1 http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fraser_spiral.svg
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